











Just What is Happening  
In Algeria?
The spectacular decapitation of the top management of the Algerian state oil company Sonatrach six weeks ago has shocked the world economic circles and convinced 
all those familiar with Algerian affairs that the war of clans for 
power and influence has taken a serious turn. Indeed, the news 
first reported by El Watan (Algerian daily of wide circulation) 
that the military Intelligence and Security Department (DRS) 
has launched a probe in corruption allegations related to the 
regularity of the awarding of major energy projects contracts 
has led in its initial phase to placing Sonatrach’s CEO, three 
of the four of the vice-Presidents, two of the CEO’s sons, the 
son of the former director of a states bank and number of 
other third-level managers within the company under judicial 
supervision and custody. In brief, Sonatrach, whose revenues 
account for 98% of Algeria’s exports and hence hard currency 
has been decapitated overnight to say the least, while the 
fourth remaining vice-President has been ‘spared’ it seems 
to run the company in the mean time. For the DRS to resort 
to such a bold measure it is clear that things have gone 
really bad between the two classic clans of Algeria’s ruling 
establishment, namely, the presidency civilian facade and 
the military represented by its intelligence branch the DRS.
This has been a classic phenomenon of Algeria’s ruling 
establishment modus operandi since the first multiparty 
parliamentary election results were scraped in January 1992 
and the President Chaldi Ben Djedid was shown the door. 
Sonatrach is more than an energy company; it is indeed 
the state. If the military ‘institution’ is the state’s backbone, 
Sonatrach is its blood and vital lifeline with the international 
community. Sonatrach is the sacred cow of the regime, all 
differences and disagreements have always spared it. For the 
DRS to dare to decimate Sonatrach’s management down to 
third level at once means that they wanted to send a strong 
signal to the other clan about who is really in charge. By 
breaching the consensus and touching the sacred cow, the 
DRS wanted to say publically to the President’s clan that they 
really meant business. This came as a surprise to even those 
familiar with Algerian affairs in that the forced amendment 
of the Constitution through the Parliament late 2008, which 
removed the clause restricting the Presidential terms to two 
only and paved the way for Bouteflika’s re-election for a 
third term last April 2009 was obviously the result of a green 
light from the military establishment. So what has changed 
so gravely to upset the deal passed a year ago and end the 
honeymoon between the presidency and the military?
Following the ‘resignation’ of Chadli in January 1992, General Larbi Belkheir, Algeria’s cardinal as he was called, declared the state of emergency and had the smart 
tactic to resurrect Mohammed Boudiaf ( a historic leader of 
the Algerian war of liberation exiled in Morocco since 1963 
following his disagreement with Ben Bella) from his exile in 
Morocco and appoint him as Algeria’s President capitulating 
on that on Boudiaf’s historic symbolism among  Algerians. 
It worked; and in the meantime Algeria started its gradual 
descent into the abysses of political violence as some factions 
of the Islamists took to arms while the military inaugurated its 
counter-terrorism war in the name of saving the Republic as 
was presented then. Five months later President Boudiaf was 
assassinated by a member of his elite Presidential Guard while 
giving a speech in Annaba.The assassination was blamed on 
the Islamist armed groups and political violence intensified. 
General Zeroual then was called back from retirement to step 
into Boudiaf’s shoes and to be elected later as President in 
1995. As soon as he was elected, Zeroual wanted to loosen 
the grip of the DRS on the political establishment and decision 
making in Algeria. He started to reshuffle positions and roles 
within the DRS to place his trusted men such as General 
Betchine and General Fodil Saidi. Zeroual’s measures were 
not appreciated by the DRS, which triggered a bras de fer 
within the Army. It started with a campaign of smear and 
corruption allegations against Betchine, then escalated with 
the killing of General Saidi. When it appeared that Zeroual 
was not impressed at all and that he was not backing down, 
summer 1997 saw unprecedented surge in terrorist massacres 
in remote villages and rural communities. Zeroual knew that 
the next phase would be his head so he called for anticipated 
Presidential elections in 1998.
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The DRS had not anticipated such a move. They had used 
all their cards, and with scrapped elections followed by the 
sacking of Chadli, assassination of Boudiaf, and resignation 
of Zeroual, they started to lose credibility internationally. Only 
a civilian figure with an international stature and revolutionary 
legacy could save the situation. General Larbi Belkheir therefore 
called Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria’s figure of Boumediene’s 
respected diplomacy, back from his long exile in the Gulf to be 
presented as Algeria’s next President.
Bouteflika was then ‘elected’ President in April 1999 and set off 
to execute the deal he passed with the military establishment. His 
mission was two-fold: first to improve the regime’s international 
image through his wide network within the influential political 
circles in the West, especially the Texas oil lobby in the U.S 
and second to convince his friends in the UAE to bring in the 
Gulf money to invest in Algeria. It is worth noting that some 
heavyweights within the military were against the Bouteflika 
option but Larbi Belkheir convinced them as the least bad 
alternative. The most important clause in the deal passed with 
Bouteflika was to prepare the public for a national reconciliation 
project. Indeed, by mid 1990s the Pinochet syndrome started 
to reign over the heads of the generals in Algeria.
President Bouteflika’s mission was to sell the Charter for National 
Reconciliation first to the families of the victims of the National 
Tragedy, as it became to be dubbed officially, and then to the 
wide Algerian public. The corner stone of the Charter was a 
clause which drops charges against all those involved in terrorist 
activities while impunity would be granted to all members of the 
state’s armed forces, and by extension the top military generals. 
Critics of the Charter saw in it a project for reconciliation without 
justice. Publicised for the West as a repeat of Chile and South 
Africa’s reconciliation projects, human rights organisations 
criticised it as an amnesty for those involved in human rights 
abuses in the 1990s. Given the sensitivity of the issue, it took 
Bouteflika a whole term of campaigning and convincing but a 
year after his re-election for a second term in 2004 he delivered 
on the deal passed with DRS in 1999. In late 2005 the Charter 
was approved by a majority through referendum and things 
seems going well between the military and their civilian facade 
(the presidency, the Parliament, opposition parties and civil 
society outlets).
By the end of Bouteflika’s second term news of disagreements 
between the two clans had become visible even to those not 
familiar with the subtleties of Algerian political life. Indeed 
during his second term, Bouteflika took advantage of his wide 
network in the West, especially through his key technocrat 
Khekib Khelil, Minister of Energy (and former director of the 
World Bank) who enjoyed the strong support of Washington 
under Bush, to shore up the Presidency’s power and influence 
in an attempt to upset the state of balance with the DRS. The 
objective was to reform the whole system where the DRS and the 
military establishment in general ceases to intervene in politics. 
President Bouteflika, thanks to the American support motivated 
by the large oil exploration contracts they were awarded in 
the Algerian Sahara as well as through close cooperation with 
Bush’s extension of the war on terror to the Sahel seemed to 
be scoring more points, as the Economist’s The World Outlook 
report of 2009 concluded. Only one thing disrupted Bouteflika’s 
plans during his second term: his heath condition. 
Indeed, the President’s health condition deteriorated considerably 
and he had to undergo surgery. Bouteflika’s clan had a Plan 
B should the he pass away while in office, which consisted of 
introducing Bouteflika’s brother Said as Algeria’s next President; 
it was especially useful given at the time the Constitution did 
not allow more than two successive terms for the President. 
Said Bouteflika was a former university lecturer and unionist 
of leftist political inclination during the mono-party system 
in the 1980s. He became his brother’s personal advisor and 
gradually his influence and managerial skills started to appear 
within the domestic scene, as was demonstrated during the 
various political events since 1999. 
The DRS grew uncomfortable with the increasing influence 
of Bouteflika as he launched major infrastructure projects 
helped largely by the considerable decrease of terrorism and 
the surge of oil prices. But, Bouteflika was nearing the end of 
his second term and with his heath condition things seemed 
uncertain. There had been much talk about amending the 
Constitution in 2007-08 but the DRS did not give the green 
light and the suspense continued until late fall 2008, when the 
Constitution was finally amended through the Parliament by 
a crashing majority as was expected. This paved the way for a 
third term for Boutefika who was re-elected for in April 2009 
with 90.2% of the votes. Those concerned with deciphering 
the inner workings of the Algerian ruling system were trying 
to understand what sort of deal was made this time. It seemed 
Bouteflika’s clan had managed to check the DRS’ power but 
not enough to overrule it and vice-versa. After all it was the 
DRS which gave the green light to amend the Constitution at 
the last minute.
A few months into his third term Bouteflika’s clan reinforced its 
activities to shore up its positions and work on Plan B resumed: 
a political party for Said Bouteflika! This coincided with the 
re-opening of a court investigation in France of the case of 
the kidnapping and assassination of seven Christian monks in 
1995, in which a French intelligence general involved in the 
negotiations at the time alleged that it was the Algerian military 
forces and not the Islamist GIA were responsible. While President 
Sarkozy jumped on this new major development to re-open 
the whole case and to address serious provocative statements 
to Algeria, Bouteflika observed deafening silence whilst the 
Army’s reputation was being sallied. Silence was also maintained 
when an Algerian diplomat was arrested in France in relation 
to a probe in the assassination of Ali M’cili, an Algerian-French 
opposition figure and lawyer in France in the 1980s. 
Thus, re-opening these two cases coupled with the acceleration 
of Plan B tipped the balance and triggered the current 
developments within Sonatrach, which has been unfolding 
so far as a repeat of the Zeroual episode of 1997-98. First cut 
his right hand: General Betchine then, Khelil, Minister of Energy, 
now. Then wait and see whether Bouteflika’s clan would back 
down or if it would take more violent measures, as was the 
case with the former President Liamin Zeroual, which eventually 
forced him to call for anticipated elections the year after and 











It is within this context that the current Sonatrach and other corruption investigations have been opened in all the key ministries of the Government. It started with Civil Works and 
the gigantic project of the East-West highway in last December, 
and following Sonatrach last month investigations are spreading 
to other ministries and projects involving foreign companies, as 
well as Khalil’s son and nephew. The novelty this time is that 
the conflict is in the open with almost daily leaks from the DRS 
in the Algerian papers and online. As a result, scores of high 
ranking executives and managers are in custody or under judicial 
supervision while investigations of the DRS are underway to 
establish the charges to be levelled to the detainees. This bras 
de fer between the Presidency and the DRS was accompanied 
by social unrest. Teachers have gone on strike twice during the 
first term, medical GPs and specialists have been on strike since 
early February and were violently repressed by the police when 
they tried to demonstrate outside the Presidency Office. Several 
On the surface it appears that the DRS has scored more points so far and are in a position to either intensify the stalemate, as investigations are still underway and social unrest gathering momentum, or to back off should Bouteflika yield. On the surface Bouteflika is not reacting; and to the general public the whole affair is being presented as  a ‘Clean Hands’ anti-
corruption campaign triggered by the President to jump-start the stalled development projects in which he invested billions of 
dollars  To those initiated in the Algerian regime’s affairs, the intelligence circles inside and outside the country offer more insight. 
According to Maghreb Intelligence sources the Bouteflika-DRS honeymoon ended in late summer 2009 when Bouteflika, in an 
effort to overrule the military establishment, decided to reopen the assassination cases of President Boudiaf in June 1992 and 
General Said Fodi (whom Zeroual wanted to appoint head of the DRS at the time) in 1996. Bouteflika went as far as setting up a 
mixed committee to establish the truth about those two cases and other events of the bloody decade of the 1990s. 
This caused an earthquake within the military establishment and constituted a grave breach of the deal passed with him when they 
first called the current President from exile in 1999. Faced with such a scenario, the DRS activated the ‘summer 1997 operating 
procedure’ and started decapitating Algeria’s most proftiable company overnight. The move came few days before Larbi Belkheir, 
the master-mind of the regime, was announced dead following a long struggle with various respiratory system problems. Although 
his death adds to the losses within the DRS ranks, the enlargement of the investigations to various sectors is a signal that their 
setbacks will not affect their ability to strike.
It is very difficult to predict how this episode would unfold. Hillary Clinton’s comments that the Sonatrach affair is an internal 
Algerian matter was decoded in Algiers as meaning Mr. Khelil won’t be saved this time. The Algerian military regime always had bad 
relations with the Democrats in Washington but this declaration was more than welcome. It only reinforces Obama’s policy stated 
in his Cairo speech. Where to go from here now? With the death of Larbi Belkheir, Algeria’s blackbox for the post-Boumedienne 
years was lost for good. This development convinced France to drop Ali M’cili’s assassination case and the Algerian diplomat was 
cleared in mid-February, just four weeks after Belkheir’s death: another victory for the DRS in their standoff with Bouteflika. Under 
Bouteflika the Algerian-French relations have deteriorated significantly, especially with the arrival of Sarcozy to power. In addition 
to the colonial legacy issues, France has lost its privileged economic partnership with Algeria and the US, China, and Italy have 
taken over.  
Traditionally, the military establishment always preferred France or the Republicans in Washington. Under Bush, American support 
increased Bouteflika’s clan influence and threatened the DRS’ power and position while relations worsened with France. With the 
arrival of the Democrats, the DRS decided for a re-orientation of the ship towards France. Their man for that mission, the current 
Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, has always made his dislike of the American influence in Algeria known and preferred strong 
relations with France and Europe. In the midst of all the chess game a security earthquake hits the Algerian ruling establishment: 
Colonel Ali Tounsi, Director of the Algerian National Police was assassinated by a fellow colonel in his office in the Police HQ in 
Algiers. According the official communiqué the perpetrator had been ‘gripped by madness’ as he proceeded to fatally wound the 
director general of the National Police.     
strikes have flared up here and there in what remained of the 
industrial state companies since last December.
Knowing the state of the worker’s union activism in Algeria, 
which has been brutally suppressed since the state of emergency 
was introduced in February 1992, it is very clear that while the 
social and economic demands of the unions are genuine it is 
apparent that they have received the green light to intensify 
the social unrest across the country. For the first time ever, the 
Minister of Education resorted to publishing an open letter 
to the teachers’ unions pleading the teachers’ unions to end 
their strike. It was ironic, because on every previous occasion 
he had ignored strike warnings and repressed those involved. 
The whole war of clans has been animated by a campaign 
to smear Bouteflika’s key men by leaking to the private press 
information about alleged corruption dealings.
